Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs? by Rotondi, Zeno
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Southampton 
Southampton SO17 1BJ 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion  Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available on our website 
http://www/soton.ac.uk/~econweb/dp/dp00.html 
 Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation:
Do We Really Need Prohibitive
Reappointment Costs?
Zeno Rotondi
University of Southampton and Banca di Roma¤
February 20, 2000
Abstract
The paper examines the current debate on the real e¤ectiveness
of delegation in overcoming the problem of time inconsistency that
a-icts discretionary monetary policy. An important contribution by
Jensen has shown that, when the government is unable to credibly
carry out optimal policy and delegates monetary policy to a central
banker with an announced incentive scheme, optimal policy can be
credible only if reappointment costs are prohibitive. This …nding is
questioned in the present analysis. In particular we show that, when
delegation is not considered as an alternative, but rather as supple-
mentary, to reputation and is conducive to reputation building for
the central banker, the circumstances under which optimal delegation
can be credible need not be so extreme. This di¤erent result is based
on the constraint that the central banker’s reputation for low in‡ation
imposes on the government’s temptation to deviate from its announce-
ments and on the role played by incentive schemes in strengthening
the central banker’s reputation.
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11 Introduction
Rogo¤’s (1985) article is regarded as the …rst example of strategic delegation
in monetary policy. The proposal to change monetary institutions to deal
with the issue of time inconsistency and the alleged in‡ationary bias is the
core idea behind the approach of monetary delegation within the literature
started by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a). Re-
cently this approach has been extended by the work of Persson and Tabellini
(1993), Walsh (1995), and Svensson (1997) among others with the introduc-
tion of incentive schemes or policy targets in order to completely remove
the in‡ationary bias.1 Despite these positive achievements the literature on
monetary delegation has been recently criticised by McCallum (1995, 1997),
who argues that as there is always the temptation for the government to
renege on the chosen monetary institution. Hence the institutional remedies
proposed by this approach do not …x the problem of time inconsistency but
merely relocate it.2’3
Persson and Tabellini, amongst others, have replied to this criticism
1Persson and Tabellini (1997) and Walsh (1998) are splendid examples of the most re-
cent available reviews on the literature on monetary delegation, with insightful discussions
on the issue of the credibility of optimal monetary delegation.
2Posen (1995) also criticises the delegation approach and provides some empirical …nd-
ings that, in contrast to the previous empirical evidence, suggest that the relationship
between central bank independence and disin‡ationary credibility is not supported. He
concludes that central bank independence alone is not su¢cient. What is also needed is the
presence of a coalition in society committed to protecting the central bank independence
as necessary for achieving low in‡ation. In particular he concludes that, as the …nancial
community is the critical constituency that in‡uences the central bank, the outcomes of
monetary policy will predominantly re‡ect that of the monetary policy desired by the
…nancial community. However, no formal analysis is presented and as shown by Alesina
(1995) his empirical …ndings are controversial.
3McCallum refers his criticism only to the Walsh contracting approach. Also Obst-
feld and Rogo¤ (1996) make the same criticism referring to the Walsh solution. There
is the view that the Rogo¤’s approach is immune to McCallum’s criticism. On that re-
gard Alesina (1995, p.289) wrote: ’it is institutionally harder to dismiss a ”conservative”
central banker than it is for the policymaker simply to renege on a policy announcement
made without the independent conservative agent’. However in his argument there is the
implicit assumption that the presence of reappointment costs will deter the government
from over-ruling the banker or sacking him and appointing a less conservative one. If,
following Jensen (1997), we interprete the principal-agent approach as a complex insti-
tutional arrangement based on a structure of incentives costly to change, then Alesina’s
argument should hold also for the Walsh approach.
2(1997, p.32) by observing that: ”in the model that dominates the literature,
what is needed is a high cost for changing the institution within the time
horizon of existing nominal contracts” and ”the cost of suddenly changing
the institution could also be a loss of reputation”.
This premise, which has been implicitly assumed in the standard lit-
erature on delegation, has been recently challenged by Jensen (1997). He
explicitly introduces the delegation stage in the government policy choice
and adds a quadratic cost for reappointments. In the static one-shot game
version higher costs of reappointment reduce the in‡ationary bias but never
remove it. An exception is represented only by the extreme and unrealistic
case where the weight on reappointment costs in the government’s loss func-
tion is in…nite. In this situation optimal monetary delegation is not subject
to a credibility problem, but all that matters in the loss function are reap-
pointment costs. Moreover if the game is repeated over an in…nite horizon,
along the lines of Barro and Gordon (1983b), the presence of reappointment
costs worsens the credibility of optimal monetary policy under delegation
compared to the case when monetary policy is conducted directly by the
government.
These results imply a negative view of the contracting solution and in
general of the monetary delegation approach. Jensen concludes (quite dras-
tically) by suggesting that too much emphasis has been given to the approach
of monetary delegation and that research should focus on other directions,
in particular on the relationships between time inconsistency and structural
policies.
Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996) and Herrendorf (1998) provide some op-
posing results based on the assumption of transparency of the delegation
process. They show that if the action of the policymaker cannot be perfectly
monitored, but the conditions under which monetary policy is delegated are
publicly observed, relocation of the time inconsistency problem can allow
the government to commit credibly to the announced institutional design.
However, Jensen (1997, p.915 note 8) argues that in the case of imperfect
monitoring of the policymaker’s action delegation improves the credibility of
monetary policy merely because delegation modi…cations are de…ned to be
transparent and the issue of secrecy is ruled out of the analysis by de…nition.4
4Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) make a similar point in criticising the transparency of the
contracting approach. They argue that it is always possible that ex-post the government
o¤ers the central banker incentives, explicitly or secretly, that can compensate him for the
loss from in‡ating.
3Thus it is not a result of delegation per se.
In the present analysis, using the same model as Jensen, we will raise
some objections to his analysis and show formally when the presence of rela-
tively high but not necessarily prohibitive costs of reappointment may ensure
that optimal monetary delegation is credible. Section 2 exposes the model.
Section 3 recalls brie‡y the main results of Jensen’s analysis. Section 4 con-
tains the results of our analysis and compares them with Jensen’s results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Apart from few minor changes in the notation and de…nitions the model is
the same as that used by Jensen. Therefore we will summarise only brie‡y
the key expressions and refer to the original version of the model for a more
detailed discussion. Our main purpose here is not to criticise the model and
assumptions used by Jensen but instead the analysis developed.5
The supply function is given by the standard expectations-augmented
Phillips curve
yt = ®(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t); (1)
where for simplicity the natural level of output is normalised to zero;
¼t,¼e
t are the actual and expected in‡ation rate respectively.
The government’s loss function is expressed by
Lt =
£
¼
2
t + ¸(yt ¡ y)
2 + '(ft ¡ f
a
t )
2¤
; (2)
where deviations of output and in‡ation from the socially optimal targets
are relatively weighted with ¸ > 0: As usual in the time inconsistency litera-
ture the output target is assumed to be greater than the natural level, y > 0.
5Jensen himself addresses a series of weakness in his assumptions, among which the most
relevant is perhaps the issue of wage contracts of longer duration than the frequency with
which a new incentive scheme can be chosen. >From a more game-theoretic point of view
the model used by Jensen su¤ers from the criticism generally made to reputational models
with trigger strategies; see for example Backus and Dri¢ll (1985) who …rst pointed out the
problems inherent in the game-theoretic framework used by Barro and Gordon (1985b),
on which Jensen’s analysis is based. On the contrary the models of Herrendorf (1998)
and al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996), that also examine the credibility of optimal monetary
delegation, use a more satisfactory game-theoretic framework for modelling reputation.
4But in contrast with the previous literature on monetary delegation, there is
a new additional cost on the reappointment of the central banker expressed
by the di¤erence between the announced incentive scheme with the penalty
fa
t and the realised one. In particular if ft 6= fa
t we will say that the central
banker has been reappointed, which in the present framework will happen
at some cost to the government. The parameter ' re‡ects the distaste for
reappointment costs relative to the other costs in the loss function. When
monetary policy is delegated we have ' > 0; otherwise ' is equal to zero.
As observed by Jensen, if ft and fa
t are understood not simply as the con-
tract proposed to the central banker but as referring to a complex system
of monetary regulations, it seems natural to assume that a small change is
less costly than a bigger one. This may justify the use of a quadratic cost of
reappointments with an assigned weight ':6
Monetary policy is delegated by the government to a central banker whose
loss function is the following
L
b
t =
£
¼
2
t + ¸(yt ¡ y)
2 + 2ft¼t
¤
: (3)
Here the central banker is …ned with the penalty 2ft for in‡ation rates
greater than zero. As we will see later on, the optimal incentive scheme that
allows the government to eliminate the in‡ation bias is ft = ¸®y.
In each period the timing of moves is the following. In stage zero, the
government delegates monetary policy to a central banker and announces an
incentive scheme fa
t . In stage 1, the private sector forms expectations about
in‡ation and sets wages. In stage 2, the government sets actual conditions
ft for monetary policy. Finally, in stage 3, the CB sets actual in‡ation.
In the discretionary regime the central banker minimises the discounted
value of his loss function,
P1
¿¡t¯
¿¡tLb
t, subject to (1) by taking in‡ation
expectations and actual conditions for monetary policy ft as given. The
parameter ¯ is the discount factor of the central banker. It is assumed
that the central banker and the government have the same discount factor.
However unlike Jensen, where 0 < ¯ < 1, we assume that the discount factor
of the central banker is de…ned in the range :5 < ¯ < 1: This weak hypothesis
6An alternative way of modelling reappointment costs would be to assume that if the
government reneges on his announcement it will also incur a …xed cost and that this
…xed component is relatively more important than that dependent on the size of the
modi…cations of the given institutional arrangement. This idea is captured, for example,
in the work of Lohmann (1992).
5has been used, for example, also by Barro (1986) and al-Nowaihi and Levine
(1996).
From the …rst order condition we obtain the central banker’s reaction
function
¼t =
¸®2¼e
t + ¸®y ¡ ft
¤
; (4)
where ¤ = (¸®2 + 1).When choosing actual monetary conditions for mon-
etary policy, the government must take its prior announcements and in‡ation
expectations as given but incorporates the behaviour of the central banker
in it’s decision problem. Thus it minimises the discounted value of its loss
function,
P1
¿¡t ¯
¿¡tLt, with respect to ft subject to (1) and (4). The min-
imisation yields the following optimal incentive scheme
ft =
'¤
1 + '¤
f
a
t ; (5)
where fa
t is the announcement chosen by government. As observed by
Jensen the assumption of prohibitive costs of reappointment when monetary
policy is delegated by the government to a central banker eliminates by def-
inition the issue of the credibility of optimal monetary delegation. From (5)
one can see that announcements will always be ful…lled if the government’s
only concern is reappointment costs, i.e. when ' ! +1.
The private sector’s in‡ation expectations are obtained by substituting
(5) into (4). After taking expectations we get
¼
e;NCD
t = ¸®y ¡
'¤
1 + '¤
f
a
t : (6)
Finally the government chooses the optimal announcement. When mak-
ing this choice the government internalises the e¤ects of its decision on the
central banker’s behaviour, on its own behaviour when choosing actual mon-
etary conditions, and on the private sector’s expectations, Minimising the
government’s loss function with respect to fa
t subject to (4), (5) and (6)
yields
f
a;NCD
t =
¤(1 + '¤)¸®y
1 + '¤2 : (7)
Expression (7) implies that
6f
NCD
t =
'¤2¸®y
1 + '¤2: (8)
Here we can observe that if ' tends to in…nite we have f
a;NCD
t = ¸®y
and fNCD
t = f
a;NCD
t . Thus, if reappointment costs are prohibitive, in the
static one-shot game version of Jensen’s model optimal monetary delegation
is not subject to a credibility problem. However, the more realistic case is
when these costs are not all that matters in the government’s loss function,
or in other words when in expression (2) the weight ' is not in…nite.
The equilibrium in‡ation rate will be under the discretionary regime with
delegation
¼
NCD
t =
¸®y
1 + '¤2: (9)
If the government does not delegate monetary policy, i.e. ' = 0, it
is straightforward to show that if the government behaves in a discretionary
manner the equilibrium in‡ation rate would be ¼NC
t = ¸®y. From expression
(9) we can see that delegation reduces the in‡ation bias but does not remove
it. On the contrary if the government could idealistically precommit to an
announced policy rule before expectations are formed then the government
would not need to delegate monetary policy in order to eliminate the in‡ation
bias and the optimal policy rule, or the precommitment policy rule, would
be in this deterministic case to set ¼PR
t = 0. Comparing the government’s
losses under the equilibrium with precommitment and the equilibrium with
discretion it is possible to see that in the case of delegation the loss is lower
than in the case when the government conducts monetary policy directly and
behaves in a discretionary manner, but is greater than in the precommiment
equilibrium.
In the subsequent sections we will consider the situation when the policy
game is repeated for an in…nite number of periods in order to study the
precommitment technology where the private sector punishes deviations by
a one-period reversion to expectations given by the discretionary solution.
73 Delegation as conducive to reputation build-
ing for the government
Let’s examine the situation when repeated interactions among the players
take place. In particular assume that the game is repeated for an in…nite
number of periods. In this case Barro and Gordon (1983b) have shown that,
if the private sector adopts a punishment strategy triggered by any observed
deviation from optimal policy and the government does not discount the
future too heavily, it is possible that the future cost for the government of
losing its reputation for being committed to zero in‡ation may more then
outweigh the current gain from deviating.
By assuming that the private sector reverts for one period to the discre-
tionary solution whenever a deviation from optimal policy is observed, Jensen
has found that the minimal requirement for the patience of the government
is given by ¯ ¸ b ¯ ´ 1=¤. If ¯ is su¢ciently high optimal monetary policy
is a perfect Nash equilibrium and therefore it is also credible. Alternatively
if the discount factor is not su¢ciently high, optimal monetary policy is not
credible. In order to achieve the precommitment solution the government
might consider delegating monetary policy to a central banker with the op-
timal incentive scheme ft = ¸®y and try again to maintain a reputation for
low in‡ation. Also in this case the credibility of optimal monetary delegation,
where credibility is understood as the ability to carry out optimal monetary
policy, can be studied by examining simple punishment strategies based on
a one-period reversion to the discretionary solution.7 Consider the following
strategy combinations:
Government plays:
ft = f
a
t = ¸®y if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1;
f
a
t = f
a;NCD
t and ft = f
NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼
e
t¡1: (10)
Private sector plays:
¼
e
t = 0 if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1;
7As observed by Jensen it is not necessary to analyse explicitly the cases when the
announcement of the government is fa
t 6= ¸®y as we can rule them out through a reversion
to the discretionary solution for any value of the discount factor.
8¼
e
t = ¼
e;NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼
e
t¡1: (11)
The expressions of ¼
e;NCD
t and fNCD
t are found by substituting f
a;NCD
t
in expressions (5) and (6) respectively. If there is a deviation from the an-
nounced optimal delegation the government minimises the loss function with
respect to ft subject to ¼e
t = 0 and f
a;DD
t = ¸®y. This yields the following
values:
¼
DD
t =
¸®y
(1 + '¤)¤
;
f
DD
t =
'¤¸®y
1 + '¤
: (12)
According to the above strategies the condition of no deviation for the
government will be
L
PR
t ¡ L
DD
t ￿ ¯
¡
L
NCD
t+1 ¡ L
PR
t+1
¢
; (13)
which implies that
¯ ¸ b ¯
D
(') ´
1 + '¤2
¤(1 + '¤)
: (14)
Now we can compare the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary
delegation with the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary policy
when monetary policy is conducted directly by the government. With this
aim Jensen has proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 . For ¯ < b ¯ and all ' > 0, (i) @b ¯
D
(')=@' > 0 and (ii)
b ¯
D
(') > b ¯.
If part (i) of the proposition is true then the credibility of optimal mone-
tary policy will be harder to support the more important reappointment costs
are. Moreover as lim'!0 b ¯
D
(') = b ¯ and given (i) it follows that b ¯
D
(') > b ¯
for all ' > 0. Thus the premise made by the standard literature on delega-
tion that it is the presence of reappointment costs that makes delegation to
an independent central banker more credible than the conduction of mon-
etary policy itself must be considered false according to Jensen’s analysis.
The intuition for this result is the following. The punishment subsequent to
9a deviation becomes weaker the higher is the weight on reappointment costs.
Also the gain from deviating decreases with ' but less than the reduction
in the cost deriving from the loss of reputation. The reason is that the re-
duction of the gain from deviating results from several opposing forces which
mitigate the e¤ect of an increase in '.
4 An alternative view on the process of dele-
gation: delegation as conducive to reputa-
tion building for the central banker
Jensen’s analysis does not take into account the possibility that an indepen-
dent and far-sighted central banker might try to establish a reputation for
being committed to low in‡ation and that this possibility might in‡uence the
behaviour of the government. Thus the question that we ask here is whether
the opportunity for a central banker, institutionally independent, to credibly
behave in a committed fashion may also have any e¤ect on the credibility of
optimal delegation. In order to answer this question in the present analysis
we assume in contrast to Jensen that in the government’s delegation problem
the central banker’s reputation plays a key role.8
As we have seen before, in each period when the government chooses the
optimal announcement fa
t it incorporates in its decision process the behaviour
of the central banker and the private sector and its behaviour when he chooses
actual monetary conditions. Furthermore, when the government chooses ft it
takes into account only the behaviour of the central banker and takes as given
private sector’s expectations and its announcements. So in both cases the
government will also incorporate in its decision problem the possibility that
the central banker may be able to maintain a reputation for being committed
8A similar approach, where the central banker’s reputation plays a key role in the del-
egation process, has been followed also by Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1996) in order
to extend Rogo¤’s delegation to a weight conservative central banker to a reputational
framework. But they do not analyse the credibility of optimal delegation when the option
for the government of reneging on the announcements made is explicitly considered. On
the contrary the approach of Jensen in de…ning the delegation problem faced by the gov-
ernment in terms only of the reputational enforcement of the government itself has been
adopted, for example, also by al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996), for examining the renego-
tiation proveness of the Walsh contract, and Herrendorf (1998), for studying Svensson’s
in‡ation targeting regime as a substitute for an explicit precommitment.
10to zero in‡ation.
In the present framework, in each period the timing of moves is the follow-
ing. In stage 0 the government delegates monetary policy to an independent
central banker and announces an incentive structure in order to make him
accountable for the outcome of monetary policy. Again, as before, the gov-
ernment repeats in each period the announcement made in the …rst period
of delegation, or period t = 0, and has the choice of either sticking to the
announcement or deviating from it. The crucial di¤erence is the following.
In stage 1, after the announcement of the government and before the private
sector’s expectations are formed the central banker announces that he will
establish a reputation for being committed to a rule for setting in‡ation inde-
pendently of the government’s behaviour. More exactly the central banker’s
announcement can be thought of as a costless announcement of an in‡ation
target.9 The subsequent stages are the same as considered before just shifted
one stage forward: in stage 2 expectations are set; in stage 3 actual mone-
tary conditions are chosen by the government; in stage 4 the central banker
chooses the in‡ation rate.
Thus if the central banker announces an in‡ation target the private sector
will expect it to be achieved no matter what the government does - both
before and after expectations are set - and whether the central banker is able
to establish a reputation for achieving the given in‡ation target will depend
on the usual condition derived from the comparison of the temptation to
deviate with the reputational enforcement. In particular if the announced
in‡ation target corresponds to the pre-commitment in‡ation rate then it
must be enforceable simultaneously under both deviation and no deviation
of the government from the announced incentive scheme. If this is not true
then the central banker will commit to the lowest enforceable in‡ation rate
simultaneously under both deviation and no deviation of the government.
The choice we have made in the analysis of focusing only on the central
banker’s reputation corresponds …rst of all to the need to establish clearly
9Dri¢ll (1997, 1994) argues that the introduction of in‡ation targets, in the form of
costless announcements, by focusing the attention on a particular reputational solution for
in‡ation may solve the problems of coordination and multiple equilibria that a¤ect repu-
tational models with trigger strategies. This idea is followed by Miller (1997) in extending
Rogo¤’s delegation approach to the reputational framework of Barro and Gordon (1985b).
Moreover Miller, considering the same model used in Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1996),
discusses the case when there are observable shocks in the economy and the announced
target should have a range around it for stabilisation purposes.
11the di¤erences relative to the analysis of Jensen. More importantly, the
choice made re‡ects also the idea that when an independent central banker
tries to establish a reputation for low in‡ation it seems realistic to postulate
that the central banker will try to resist any possible in‡uence from the
government that would undermine the credibility of his announcements on
the in‡ation target. This implies that the announced in‡ation target must be
sustainable as a reputational equilibrium whether the government deviates
or not. Moreover as we will show in our analysis, if this behaviour of the
central banker is common knowledge among the players, the central banker
has an incentive to behave in this way because then it is possible for him to
constrain the government to make credible announcements without relying
on its reputation for not reneging on the announced incentive scheme.
Similarly to Jensen’s analysis we will rule out, by means of a reversion
to the discretionary solution, feasible strategy combinations which include
announcements that do not imply the achievement of the precommitment
solution.
The delegation problem for the government is the following. Given that
the discount factor ¯ is not su¢ciently high and that establishing areputation
for low in‡ation is not an available option, the government decides to delegate
monetary policy and must choose an initial announcement fa
0 that minimises
its expected losses. Now in order to avoid a reversion to the discretionary
solution, triggered by an in‡ation target announced by the central banker
di¤erent from zero, the government will consider only announcements fa
t > 0
that imply that the central banker is able to maintain a reputation for being
committed to the precommitment in‡ation rate, independently of whether
or not the government deviates from the announced incentive structure. The
announcements that satisfy this requirement are optimal for the government
and, as we will see later on, another di¤erence relative to Jensen’s analysis
is that here the number of optimal announcements for the government can
be greater than one depending on the assumed value of '.
So our initial task is to …nd the set of optimal announcements for the
government that ensure the achievement of optimal monetary policy by the
central banker. The problem is complicated by the fact that when the central
banker commits to the announced in‡ation target he does not know whether
the government will deviate or not. It is possible to show that the key to
the solution of the delegation problem for the government is to eliminate
the uncertainty about its own behaviour and ensure that the central banker
expects that the announcement made by the government will always be ful-
12…lled. Actually, in the present framework the government has no interest
in introducing this uncertainty as it is optimal for it to induce the central
banker to announce a zero in‡ation target and avoid any reversion to the
discretionary solution.
Now suppose the central banker has announced an in‡ation target equal
to zero and that this target is sustainable in the case when the government
sticks to its announced incentive scheme. Consider a deviation by the gov-
ernment. Due to the presence of reappointment costs a necessary condition
for a deviation by the government is that the central banker deviates after a
deviation by the government and creates unexpected in‡ation. Only in this
case may the government have an incentive to deviate from the announced
institutional arrangement as the gain from surprise in‡ation can more than
compensate the reappointment costs. Assuming again that this is common
knowledge among the players, the fact that the central banker deviates af-
ter a deviation by the government and creates unexpected in‡ation implies
necessarily that the announced in‡ation target is not sustainable as a rep-
utational equilibrium. But this contradicts the claim that in order to avoid
a reversion to the discretionary solution, triggered by an in‡ation target
announced by the central banker di¤erent from zero, the government will
consider only announcements that imply that the central banker is able to
maintain a reputation for being committed to the precommitment in‡ation
rate.
So it must be the case that, if the announcement of the government is
optimal, the necessary condition for a deviation by the government is never
satis…ed, i.e. if a deviation by the government occurs the central banker
never deviates from optimal monetary policy. Notice that in Jensen’s analy-
sis the necessary condition for a deviation by the government discussed here
is always satis…ed as the central banker is assumed to behave only in a discre-
tionary manner. On the contrary, in the present framework the presence of
the central banker’s reputation combined with the presence of reappointment
costs constrains the behaviour of the government and introduces an incen-
tive for the government to always ful…l its announcements and eliminate the
uncertainty about its behaviour.
The working of this mechanism will appear more clearly after the for-
malisation of the necessary conditions for the existence of the reputational
equilibrium in which the precommitment in‡ation rate is sustainable.
134.1 The set of optimal announcements for the govern-
ment
Before starting with the analysis of the credibility of optimal monetary dele-
gation we need to …nd the set of optimal announcements for the government.
For expositional reasons we separate the set of announcements of the govern-
ment after which if it does not deviate the central banker is able to sustain
zero in‡ation as a reputational equilibrium, from the set of announcements
after which if it deviates the central banker is able to sustain zero in‡ation
as a reputational equilibrium. From the above discussion it is clear that the
set of optimal announcements for the government will be the set that is the
intersection of the two above distinct sets.
In order that a solution to the delegation problemof the government exists
and a reversion to the discretionary solution is avoided, the two set considered
must not be mutually exclusive. This latter condition will be examined in
the next section. Here we …nd only the optimal announcements for the
government. In the following analysis it is understood that if the discount
factor of the government is su¢ciently high, i.e. ¯ ¸ b ¯; the government does
not delegate monetary policy. We will examine the credibility of optimal
monetary delegation only in the case when the government is not able to
build a reputation for low in‡ation. Thus here the delegation solution is not
alternative to the reputational solution, as claimed in the standard theory of
delegation, but rather supplementary.
4.1.1 No deviation by the government
If we assume that the government does not deviate, the announcement fa
t > 0
chosen by the government will be within the set of announcements that imply
that the central banker is able to maintain a reputation for being commit-
ted to zero in‡ation. Thus in each period the government will announce
fa
t = fa
0 2 £ , where fa
0 is the initial announcement and £ is the set of an-
nouncements that ensure that the precommitment solution can be sustained
as a reputational equilibrium when the government does not deviate from
the announcement made. Consider the following strategy combinations:
Central Banker plays:
¼t = 0 if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1; (15)
¼t = ¼
NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼
e
t¡1:
14Private Sector plays:
¼
e
t = 0 if ¼t¡1 = 0; (16)
¼
e
t = ¼
e;NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= 0:
Government plays:
ft = f
a
t = f
a
0 if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1; (17)
f
a
t = f
a;NCD
t and ft = f
NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼
e
t¡1;
where f
a;NCD
t and fNCD
t are the same as in (10).
The condition of no deviation from zero in‡ation for the central banker
when the government sticks to the announcement made will be
L
b;PR
t ¡ L
b;DD
t ￿ ¯
³
L
b;NCD
t+1 ¡ L
b;PR
t+1
´
: (18)
The above condition implies that
¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤
(f
a
0;') ´
(¸®y ¡ fa
0)
2(1 + '¤2)
2
¤
£
(¸®y)
2(1 + 2'¤2)
¤ : (19)
Considering condition (19) with equality and fa
0 as the unknown term, it
is possible to see that there are two values of fa
0 that satisfy this equation:
µ(') = ¸®y
1 + '¤2 ¡
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
(1 + '¤2)
> 0; (20)
µ(') = ¸®y
1 + '¤2 +
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
(1 + '¤2)
> 0:
In the appendix it is shown that for the assumed parameter values µ(') >
0. Now, inspection of condition (19) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 . For fa
0 = µ 2 £('); with £(') ´
£
µ(');µ(')
¤
, (i) ¯ ¸
b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;'); (ii) £(') ¾ £
¡
'
0¢
, with ' < '
0 ;(iii) @b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;')=@' > 0:
15Part (i) of this proposition says that if the government’s announcement
is chosen between µ(') and µ(') the condition (19) is satis…ed. According to
part (ii) the set £('); i.e. the set of announcements under which the pre-
commitment solution can be sustained as a reputational equilibrium when
the government does not deviate, with given ' becomes smaller as reappoint-
ment costs become more important. Finally part (iii) says that, for a given
government’s announcement, increasing the weight ' on reappointment costs
makes condition (19) harder to ful…l. Let’s proof proposition 2.
PROOF. In the present framework, for given '; the government’s an-
nouncement fa
0 is the choice variable in the government’s delegation problem.
Now considering condition (19) with equality and given '; we can draw (see
Figure 1) the quadratic function b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;') as a parabola having a global
minimum at fa
0 = ¸®y with b ¯
b¤
(¸®y;') = 0. The function b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;') will
be equal to ¯ for two values of fa
0; which correspond to µ(') and µ('). It is
possible to see that the two values µ(') and µ(') are respectively lower and
greater than ¸®y and both tend to ¸®y as ' ! +1.
From the above discussion it follows that ¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;') for all values of
fa
0 included between µ(') and µ('). Thus the set £(') is de…ned between
these two extreme values. With a minor abuse of notation, in proposition 2
we have assumed that the function b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;') is de…ned also for fa
0 = ¸®y.
Formally it would be more correct to say that this function is not de…ned in
that point as the central banker always chooses zero in‡ation independently
of the value of ¯.
Part (ii) can be proved using the following …rst derivative:
@I¤(')
@'
= ¡
2'¤4p
¤¯
(1 + '¤2)
2p
1 + 2'¤2 < 0; (21)
with
I
¤(') ´ µ(') ¡ µ(') =
2
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
1 + '¤2 ; (22)
which shows that for the assumed parameter values the interval I¤(')
is always reduced by higher values of '. As the limit of µ(') and µ(') for
' ! +1 is in both cases ¸®y; it follows that as ' increases the set £(')
becomes smaller and will shrink to the element ¸®y.
16We can now turn to part (iii) of proposition 2. Here we can consider the
following …rst derivative
@b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;')
@'
=
2(®¸y ¡ fa
0)
2(1 + '¤2)¤3'
(¸®y)
2 (1 + 2'¤2)
2 > 0; (23)
which for the assumed parameter values is always positive. Thus for
a given announcement fa
0 as ' increases the condition (19) will be harder
to ful…l. This result is a consequence of part (ii) of proposition 2. To see
this consider Figure 1. If part (ii) holds, then an increase of ' shrinks the
parabola constituted by the function b ¯
b¤
(fa
0;') to the vertical axis passing
through fa
0 = ¸®y: Thus as shown in Fig.1 with the dotted line, for given
fa
0, the value of the function will be higher. QDE.
4.1.2 Deviation by the government
Consider now the case of a deviation by the government from the announced
fa
t . In stage 1 the central banker does not know whether or not the govern-
ment will deviate. However the announced in‡ation target must be enforce-
able also under a deviation by the government.
As reappointments with ft 6= fa
t and ' > 0 are costly, the government
may deviate from the announced incentive structure if and only if the cen-
tral banker follows the government’s deviation and deviates as well. So a
necessary condition for a deviation by the government is fa
0 = 2 ©, where © is
the set of announcements under which the precommitment solution can be
sustained as a reputational equilibrium when the government deviates. On
the contrary, if the central banker is able to maintain a reputation for low
in‡ation after a deviation by the government, then the government, due to
the presence of reappointment costs, has never an incentive to deviate and
the announcement fa
0 = Á 2 © will always be ful…lled.
Notice that the fact that the announcement is always ful…lled does not
imply that it is also optimal for the government to announce it because, as we
have seen previously, it is possible that the central banker might not be able
to sustain the precommitment in‡ation rate as a reputational equilibrium
when the government does not deviate.
Now, as implied by the above discussion, the announcements fa
0 = Á 2 ©
can be derived fromthe necessary condition for a deviation by the government
assuming that the central banker has announced a zero in‡ation target. In
17this case the strategies of the central banker and the private sector are the
same as in the previous case, given by (15) and (16). On the contrary, the
strategy of the government is now based on the assumption that also the
central banker will deviate after its deviations. We have:
Government plays:
ft 6= f
a
t = f
a
0 if ¼t¡1 = ¼
e
t¡1; (24)
f
a
t = f
a;NCD
t and ft = f
NCD
t if ¼t¡1 6= ¼
e
t¡1;
where f
a;NCD
t and fNCD
t are the same as in (10). When the government
deviates the …rst time from the announcement it chooses ft = fDD
t , which is
the same of expression (12).
Here the minimal condition for the patience of the central banker implies
that
¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤¤
(f
a
0;') ´
[¸®y (1 + '¤) ¡ fa
0'¤]
2(1 + '¤2)
2
(1 + '¤)
2¤(¸®y)
2(1 + 2'¤2)
: (25)
Again it is possible to show that there are two values of fa
0 that satisfy
the condition (25) taken with equality. Here we have
Á(') = ¸®y
1 + '¤2 ¡
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
(1 + '¤)
¡1(1 + '¤2)'¤
> 0; (26)
Á(') = ¸®y
1 + '¤2 +
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
(1 + '¤)
¡1(1 + '¤2)'¤
> 0:
Again in the appendix it is shown that for the assumed parameter values
Á(') > 0. Following the discussion made before, the necessary condition for
a deviation of the government is given by ¯ < b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;'). On the contrary if
(25) holds, the government does never have an incentive to deviate and the
announcement made by the government will always be ful…lled. Inspection
of condition (25) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3 . For fa
0 = Á 2 ©('); with ©(') ´
£
Á(');Á(')
¤
, (i)
¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;'); (ii) ©(') ¾ ©
¡
'
0¢
, with ' < '
0 ;(iii) @b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;')=@' T 0:
18Part (i) ofthis proposition says thatiffa
0 is chosen between Á(') andÁ(');
then for given ' condition (25) is satis…ed. According to part (ii) the set ©;
i.e. the set of announcements under which the precommitment solution can
be sustained as a reputational equilibrium when the government deviates,
becomes smaller as reappointment costs become more important. Finally
part (iii) says that the weight ' on reappointment costs has an ambiguous
e¤ect on condition (25). Let’s proof proposition 3.
PROOF. Again we consider for given ' the government’s announce-
ment fa
0 as the choice variable in the government’s delegation problem.
Taking condition (25) with equality we can draw (see Fig.2) the quadratic
function b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;') as a parabola having a global minimum at ¾(') =
¸®y [(1 + '¤)='¤]; with b ¯
b¤¤
(¾;') = 0. The function b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;') will be
equal to ¯ for two values of fa
0 which correspond to Á(') and Á('). The
two values Á(') and Á(') are respectively lower and greater than ¾(') and,
as well as ¾('), both tend to ¸®y as ' ! +1. The above discussion im-
plies that ¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;') for all values of fa
0 included between Á(') and
Á('). Thus the set © of announcements is de…ned between these two ex-
treme values. As before, with a minor abuse of notation, in proposition 3
we have assumed that the function b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;') is de…ned also for fa
0 = ¾ (').
However in this case ft = fa
t ['¤=(1 + ¤')] = ¸®y and therefore it would
be more correct to say that this function is not de…ned in that point as the
central banker always chooses zero in‡ation independently from the value of
¯.
Part (ii) can be proved using the following …rst derivative:
@I¤¤(')
@'
= ¡
2
p
¯ (1 + 3'¤2 + 3'2¤4 + '3¤5)
'2p
¤(1 + 2'¤2)(1 + '¤2)
2 < 0; (27)
with
I
¤¤(') ´ Á(') ¡ Á(') =
2(1 + '¤)
p
¯ (1 + 2'¤2)
'
p
¤(1 + '¤2)
: (28)
The above derivative is always negative for the assumed parameter values.
This implies that as ' increases the set © becomes smaller and will shrink
to the element ¾ ('), i.e. the intermediate element between the lower and
upper bound of the set ©. Thus as ' increases the parabola constituted by
the function b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;') shrinks to the vertical axis passing through ¾ (').
19However, di¤erently from before, as the limit of Á('), Á(') and ¾(')for
' ! +1 in all three cases is ¸®y. Thus, as shown in Fig.2 with the dotted
line, the parabola shifts also to the left in the cartesian coordinate plane
together with the vertical axis passing through ¾(').
Now considering part (iii) of proposition 2, we can see from the following
…rst derivative
@b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;')
@'
= ¡2
fa
0 + fa
0 ['¤2(3 + '2¤3 + 3'¤2)] ¡ ¸®y ['¤2(¤ + '2¤3 + 2'¤2)]
[¸®y(1 + '¤) ¡ fa
0'¤]
¡1 (1 + '¤2)
¡1(1 + '¤)
3(¸®y)
2(1 + 2'¤2)
2;
(29)
that a marginal increase in ' will have an ambiguous e¤ect depending on
the value of fa
0. It is possible to show that the derivative becomes negative
for
° (') < f
a
0 < ¾ ('); (30)
with
° (') = ¸®y
'¤3(1 + '¤)
2
[1 + '¤2(3'¤2 + '2¤3 + 3)]
< ¸®y: (31)
For fa
0 > ¾ (') or fa
0 < ° (')the sign of the derivative will be positive.
Similarly to the previous proposition, this result is a consequence of part (ii)
of proposition 3. The ambiguous sign of the derivative is determined by the
fact that now an increase of ' both restricts and shifts to the left in the
cartesian coordinate plane the parabola implied by the function b ¯
b¤¤
(fa
0;').
QDE.
4.2 The analysis of the credibility of optimal monetary
delegation
As observed above the government’s announcement is optimal if it belongs
both to the set of announcements after which, if the government does not
deviate, the central banker is able to sustain zero in‡ation as a reputational
equilibrium and to the set of announcements after which, if the government
20deviates, the central banker maintains his reputation too. Using propositions
1 and 2, it follows that an announcement Ã that belongs to the set ª(') ´
£(') \ ©(') is optimal: The set of optimal announcements is illustrated in
Fig.3, where the two curves intersect each other.
In the present framework examining the credibility of optimal delegation
- where credibility is understood as the ability to carry out optimal mone-
tary policy - implies to study the circumstances under which there exists an
optimal announcement for the government, i.e. the set ª is not empty. It is
possible to show that, if the weight on reappointment costs is su¢ciently high
but not necessarily in…nite, there is always at least one optimal announce-
ment Ã 2 ª 6= ; available for solving the government’s delegation problem.
To see this we consider the following proposition:
Proposition 4 . If ¯ ¸ b ¯ the government conducts directly monetary policy,
whereas if ¯ < b ¯ the government delegates monetary policy to an independent
central banker and announces an optimal incentive scheme fa
0. For fa
0 = Ã 2
ª(') ´ £(') \ ©(') and ' ¸ b ';(i) ª(') 6= ; and (ii) 0 < b ' < +1:
This proposition says that if the weight ' is greater or equal to the thresh-
old value b ' the set of optimal announcements for the government ª(') is not
empty and there exists at least one announcement Ã 2 ª(') available at the
delegation stage. Moreover, in the most important part of this proposition,
it claims that this threshold value is not in…nite and therefore reappointment
costs need not be prohibitive in order to ensure that delegation credibly de-
livers the same outcomes of the precommitment equilibrium.
PROOF. Consider …rst part (i). As we said above there exists an optimal
fa
t = Ã 2 ª(') as long as ª(') ´ £(') \ ©(') 6= ;. From propositions 2
and 3 it is possible to see that, for 0 < ' < +1, Á(') > µ(')(as Á(') >
¾(') and µ(') < ¸®y). Moreover it is possible to see that
Á(') ¡ µ(') =
Á(')
1 + '¤
> 0; (32)
Á(') ¡ µ(') =
Á(')
1 + '¤
> 0:
It follows that ª(') ´
£
Á(');µ(')
¤
. Now ª(') 6= ; if and only if
µ(') ¡ Á(') ¸ 0: (33)
21So we need to …nd the values of ' that solve this expression. Unfortu-
nately this is a third order polynomial. By using, for instance, Maple c ° we
can get three roots which are very complicated to study. This implies that,
considering part (ii), in order to show that 0 < b ' < +1 we need to perform
a very complicated numerical simulation.
Let’s follow a simpler route. After some simpli…cations the weak inequal-
ity (33) can be rewritten as
(1 + 2'¤)
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2)
(1 + '¤2)
¸ 1: (34)
If the government delegates monetary we must have ¯ < 1=¤. This
implies that ¯¤ < 1. Moreover, the inequality ¯ < 1=¤ implies also that
under delegation we have 1 < ¤ < 2, as :5 < ¯ < 1. Taking the limit for
' ! 0 we obtain
p
¯¤ ¸ 1; (35)
which is never true if ¯¤ < 1. So the threshold value for ' must be
greater than zero. If ' ! +1, the term on the left-hand side of the weak
inequality (34) tends to in…nity. Moreover the …rst derivative with respect
to ' of this term is
¤
p
¯¤[2 + '¤2(6 ¡ ¤ + 2'¤2)]
(1 + '¤2)
2p
1 + 2'¤2 > 0; (36)
which is always positive for 1 < ¤ < 2. Hence, there always exists a value
of b ', such that 0 < b ' < +1, that satis…es the weak inequality (33). The
weak inequality is satis…ed also by all ' ¸ b '.
In order to have an idea of the range of b ' it is possible to proceed in
the following way. Inspection of (34) yields some useful information. In
particular we can see that, if ¤ < 2, then
(1 + 2'¤)
(1 + '¤2)
> 1: (37)
Moreover we have that
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2) ¸ 1; (38)
if
22' ¸ e ' =
1 ¡ ¯¤
2¯¤3 : (39)
Expression (39) constitutes a su¢cient condition for the existence of an
optimal announcement for the government, as we clearly have e ' > b '. It
is possible to see that the highest possible value of e ' is for ¤ ! 1 and for
¯ ! :5. In this case we …nd that e ' ! :5. So we can conclude that 0 < b ' < :5.
QDE.
So proposition 4 shows that under delegation optimal monetary policy
can be more credible than under the conduction of monetary policy directly
by the government. If the weight on reappointment costs is su¢ciently high,
but not necessarily in…nite, there always exists an announcement available for
the government such that the central banker is able to sustain zero in‡ation
as a reputational equilibrium no matter whether the government deviates or
not from the announcement made. As the central banker behaviour cannot
be in‡uenced and reappointments are costly, the government never deviates
and will stick to the announcement made. Thus, McCallum’s criticism of the
delegation approach does not hold provided that the costs of changing mon-
etary institutions are su¢ciently high. Reappointment costs play a crucial
role in the delegation process but in contrast to the contracting approach to
delegation, based on the static one-shot game framework, also the central
banker’s reputation for being committed to low in‡ation has a fundamental
role for the credibility of optimal delegation.
4.3 Comparison with Jensen’s analysis
Now, in order to compare our analysis with that of Jensen we examine the
case where the government focuses only on the incentive scheme that would
be optimal in the static one-shot game and announces fa
0 = ¸®y: Thus in
our framework the requirement for the patience of the central banker that
must be satis…ed for the credibility of optimal delegation is only (25), which
now becomes
¯ ¸ b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;') ´
(1 + '¤2)
2
(1 + '¤)
2¤(1 + 2'¤2)
: (40)
Even if condition (40) is referred to the central banker instead of the gov-
ernment, it is similar to the condition analysed by Jensen (which is given in
23our framework by (14)). Its ful…lment implies that, if the government dele-
gates monetary policy to a central banker announcing the incentive scheme
fa
0 = ¸®y, optimal monetary policy will be credible. The main di¤erence
is that in our framework the ful…lment of the government’s announcement
is related to the central banker’s reputation for low in‡ation. On the con-
trary in Jensen’s analysis the ful…lment of the government’s announcement
is related to the government’s reputation for low in‡ation.
Let’s compare the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary policy
when the government conducts by itself monetary policy with the condition
that secures the credibility of optimal monetary policy under delegation.
From condition (40) it is possible to derive the following corollary:
Corollary 5 :
lim
'!+1
b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;') = 0;
lim
'!0
b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;') = b ¯:
Moreover it is possible to prove the following proposition which is in our
framework the equivalent of proposition 1:
Proposition 6 . For ¯ < b ¯ and all ' > 0, (i) @b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;')=@' < 0 and
(ii) b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;') < b ¯.
PROOF. From condition (40) follows that
@b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;')
@' = ¡
2(1 + '¤2)['¤2(3 ¡ ¤ + '¤2) + 1]
(1 + '¤)
3(1 + 2'¤2)
2 < 0 (41)
for all ' > 0 and 1 < ¤ < 2 (implied by ¯ < b ¯): Using corollary 1
immediately follows also that b ¯
b¤¤
(¸®y;') < b ¯: QDE.
So, in contrast with what is stated in proposition 1, according to propo-
sition 5 the condition for the credibility of optimal monetary policy under
delegation becomes weaker as ' increases.
The intuition for this di¤erent result is the following. In our framework
it is possible to see that the punishment (for the central banker) following
24a deviation at t,
³
L
b;NCD
t+1 ¡ L
b;PR
t+1
´
, becomes weaker the higher is '. As
in the case of Jensen (but referred to the government’s loss) the reason is
because L
b;PR
t+1 is independent of ' and L
b;NCD
t+1 is a decreasing function of '.
But the penalty for the central banker from in‡ating is twice higher then
the cost for the government from deviating from the announcement made at
t: We can see that under the discretionary solution we have 2fNCD
t+1 ¼NCD
t+1 =
2'
³
fNCD
t+1 ¡ f
a;NCD
t+1
´2
: Thus the punishment will be higher in our case for
a given value of '.
Now consider the gain from deviation in period t: Here again L
b;PR
t is
independent of ' while L
b;DD
t increases with '. Consequently, the temptation
to deviate, expressed by
³
L
b;PR
t ¡ L
b;DD
t
´
, decreases also with '. However,
the increase of L
b;DD
t is higher than in the case of Jensen (again referred to
the government’s loss) as 2fDD
t+1¼DD
t+1 = 2'
³
fDD
t+1 ¡ f
a;DD
t+1
´2
. So in our case
for a given value of ' the incentive to deviate will be lower than in the case
considered by Jensen.
These di¤erences relative to Jensen’s analysis ensure that if reappoint-
ment costs become more important the decrease in the temptation to deviate
will be higher than the decrease in the punishment from deviating.
5 Conclusions
The analysis developed has shown that, contrary to Jensen’s analysis, institu-
tional arrangements based on incentive structures which delegate monetary
policy to an independent and far-sighted central banker and are costly to
change, under certain circumstances which are not extreme, may be more
credible than the conduct of monetary policy without delegation. In partic-
ular, our results suggest that if the weight assigned to reappointment costs
in the loss function of the government is relatively high, but not necessarily
in…nite, McCallum’s criticism of the delegation approach does not hold. This
result is due to the presence of reappointment costs but there is an impor-
tant distinction with respect to the standard theory of monetary delegation,
based on the static one-shot game. It crucially depends on the in‡uence on
the behaviour of the government of the central banker’s reputation for being
committed to low in‡ation.
The recent literature on the credibility of optimal monetary delegation
25when delegation can be changed, as exempli…ed by the works of Jensen
(1997), Herrendorf (1998), and al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996), has shown
that the delegation solution for time inconsistency can be conducive to rep-
utation building for the government and hence is not an alternative to the
reputational solution, as is usually claimed in the standard theory, but is
at best supplementary. However this new body of literature, by assum-
ing that the central banker behaves always in a discretionary fashion, has
focused exclusively on the reputational enforcement of the government for
being committed to the announced institutional arrangements or to low in-
‡ation. This assumption is based on the view, formalised in the standard
theory, that incentive schemes or policy targets are introduced in order to
constrain the behaviour of the central banker according to the objectives of
the government.
The view of the delegation process formalised in our analysis is quite dif-
ferent, as one of the main e¤ects of the introduction of an incentive structure
that is costly to change is to enhance the central banker’s reputation. More-
over, via his commitment to the announced in‡ation target the central banker
indirectly constrains the behaviour of the government. Hence we agree with
McCallum (1997, p.109) when he insightfully argues about the possible pos-
itive implications of contract or incentive arrangements for central bankers:
”.. the main e¤ect of such arrangements [as those of New Zealand’s] is not
principally to constrain the central bank to act in accordance with the gov-
ernment’s objectives, but rather to constrain the government by increasing
the di¢culty of its bringing pressure to in‡ate upon the central bank.... Ar-
rangements such as those of New Zealand’s, therefore, give the central banks
an increased opportunity to behave in a rule-like, committed fashion”.
As clari…ed by our analysis, the role played by incentive schemes in
strengthening the central banker’s reputation is crucial for the importance of
reappointment costs. In particular the constraint that the central banker’s
reputation imposes on the government’s temptation to deviate from the an-
nounced incentive scheme may signi…cantly reduce the amount of reappoint-
ment cost required for disciplining the government’s behaviour.
6 Appendix: proof that Á and µ are positive
We …rst recall that the assumptions about the parameters are the following:
26:5 < ¯ < 1; (42)
¯ < b ¯ =
1
¤
;
¤ = 1 + ¸®
2;
which imply that
1 < ¤ < 2; (43)
¯¤ < 1:
Given these assumptions, µ and Á are always positive if we can prove that
1 + '¤
2 ¡
p
¯¤(1 + 2'¤2) > 0: (44)
This inequality can be rewritten as
1 + '¤
2 ¡
q
¯¤
£
(1 + '¤2)
2 ¡ ('¤2)
2¤
> 0: (45)
As from the assumed parameter values we have that
p
¯¤ < 1 , it is clear
that the term outside the square root is always greater than that inside.
Hence the inequality is always satis…ed.
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Figure 3.  The set of optimal announcements available for the government.